A general model of best response adaptation

Ulrich Berger ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: We develop a general model of best response adaptation in large populations for symmetric and asymmetric conflicts with role-switching. For special cases including the classical best response dynamics and the symmetrized best response dynamics we show that the set of Nash equilibria is attracting for zero-sum games. For asymmetric conflicts and equally large populations, convergence to a Nash equilibrium in the base game implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium on the Wright manifold in the role game.

Keywords: Role Games; Best Response Adaptation; Learning; Evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2003-03-25
Note: Type of Document - pdf-file; pages: 21; figures: included
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303008

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