Allocation Rules for Network Games

Matthew O. Jackson ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given network structure. I present a family of allocation rules that incorporate information about alternative network structures when allocating value.

Keywords: networks; network games; allocation rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 A14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2003-03-28
Note: Type of Document - ; figures: included
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Related works:
Working Paper: Allocation Rules for Network Games (2003)
Working Paper: Allocation Rules for Network Games (2003)
Journal Article: Allocation rules for network games (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303010

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