Matching games with partial information

Paolo Laureti

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual ``satisfactions''. Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded rationality in a generalized {\it Marriage Problem}, comparing the benefits obtained by self-searching and by a matchmaker. Finally we propose a modified matching game intended to mimic the way consumers' information makes firms to enhance the quality of their products in a competitive market.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Marriage Problem; Bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C73 C61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2003-07-16
Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on linux; to print on PostScript; pages: 19; figures: included. Published on Physica A 324(1- 2) 49-65 (2003)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0307002

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