Proportional Payoffs in a Model of Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions

Maria Montero ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper studies coalition formation and payoff division in majority games under the following assumptions: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most natural bargaining protocol, both ex ante and ex post payoff division are proportional to the voting weights. Other bargaining rules may generate counterintuitive comparative statics.

Keywords: Coalition formation; two-stage bargaining; reversible coalitions; majority games; proportional payoffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2003-08-13
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 24

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0308001

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