Is Batting Last an Advantage?

Theodore Turocy ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper applies the theory of zero-sum stochastic games to assess the validity of baseball's ancient wisdom that batting last confers a strategic advantage. Results from numerical calculation of Markov perfect equilibrium suggest that the team that bats last will have an advantage if in fact the offense has, in some sense, more useful strategic actions available than the defense. An example is provided where the advantage depends on details of the teams playing. Regardless of which team has the advantage, all calculations indicate the advantage is negligible in magnitude.

Keywords: zero-sum games; Markov perfect equilibrium; baseball (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: Written
Note: Type of Document - TeXmacs; prepared on Linux; to print on PostScript; pages: 24 ; figures: none

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0309002

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