Monetary trading: An Optimal Exchange System

Guilherme Carmona ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: We show that monetary trading is simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible in a natural framework. Furthermore, we show that the utility for each economic agent is at least as big under the monetary system as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible trading system of the same complexity. Thus, we rationalize the monetary nature of real-world trade as being an efficient way to achieve those properties.

Keywords: Monetary Trading; Social Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 E40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mon
Date: 2003-09-05
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on XP; to print on HP/PostScript/Franciscan monk; pages: 48 ; figures: included/request from author/draw your own
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0309/0309004.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Monetary Trading: An Optimal Exchange System (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0309004

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