Agreeing to agree

Ehud Lehrer () and Dov Samet

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: Aumann(1976) has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E *do* coincide? A necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty *finite* event F with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at $F$ that the agents cannot tell whether or not $E$. Second, this still holds true at F, when F becomes common knowledge.

Keywords: agreement theorems; common knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2003-10-09
Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 20
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0310005

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