Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games

H. Reiju Mihara

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper investigates algorithmic computability of simple games (voting games). It shows that (i) games with a finite carrier are computable, (ii) computable games have both finite winning coalitions and cofinite losing coalitions, and (iii) computable games violate any conceivable notion of anonymity, including finite anonymity and measurebased anonymity. The paper argues that computable games are excluded from the intuitive class of gniceh infinite games, employing the notion of ginsensitivityh\-equal treatment of any two coalitions that differ only on a finite set.

Keywords: Voting games; infinitely many players; ultrafilters; recursion theory; Turing computability; finite carriers; finite winning coalitions; algorithms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 C69 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp and nep-mfd
Date: 2003-10-31, Revised 2004-06-01
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on Mac OS X; pages: 15; To appear in Mathematical Social Sciences figures: None
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Related works:
Journal Article: Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0310006

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