Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems

Somdeb Lahiri ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, cntract choic problems. We provide conditions under which a contract choice problem has a non-empty set of "stable" outcomes. There are two types of stability concepts we study in this paper:cooperative stability and non- cooperative stability. The cooperative stability concept that we invoke here is the core. We also show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeilds outcomes for a generalized marriage problem, which necessarily belong to the core. The non-cooperative stability concept that we study here is individual stability. The final result of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining st.

Keywords: stable outcomes; core; individual stability; weak bargaining set; contract choice problem; matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Date: 2003-11-03
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on Win98; to print on hp Laserjet 2300d; pages: 17; figures: 0. 17 pages,pdf
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Journal Article: Stable outcomes for contract choice problems (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0311001

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