On the Purification of Nash Equilibria of Large Games

Guilherme Carmona ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: We consider Salim Rashid's asymptotic version of David Schmeidler's theorem on the purification of Nash equilibria. We show that, in contrast to what is stated, players' payoff functions have to be selected from an equicontinuous family in order for Rashid's theorem to hold. That is, a bound on the diversity of payoffs is needed in order for such asymptotic result to be valid.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; large games; purification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-11-22
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on win xp; to print on general; pages: 6; figures: 0. none
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Purification of Nash Equilibria of Large Games (2003)
Journal Article: On the purification of Nash equilibria of large games (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0311007

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