Stakeholders in Bilateral Conflict

Paola Manzini () and Clara Ponsati ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: The resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved in the confrontation (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised, models addressing negotiations in such situations ought to account for the role and interests of the stakeholder - a third party whose stake is linked to the original negotiations. In this paper we address the strategic role of stakeholders in bilateral confrontations that take the form of a war of attrition; we assume that the bilateral confrontation runs concurrently with the parties interaction with the stakeholder, that chooses strategically her timing to intervene and take action to promote agreement. We show that under complete information the interplay of different interests in this tripartite timing game results in delayed outcomes. We also explore the role of incomplete information and show that asymmetries of information do not necessarily translate in increased inefficiency.

Keywords: stakeholders; bargaining; war of attrition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D74 J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-11-27
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Related works:
Journal Article: Stakeholders in bilateral conflict (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0311008

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