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Metabolism of Social System: N-Person Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Analysis In Random Boolean Network

Hokky Situngkir () and Deni Khanafiah

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: Random Boolean Network has been used to find out regulation patterns of genes in organism. This approach is very interesting to use in a game such as N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma. Here we assume that agent’s action is influenced by input in the form of choices of cooperate or defect she accepted from other agent or group of agents in the system. Number of cooperators, pay-off value received by each agent, and average value of the group, are observed in every state, from initial state chosen until it reaches its state-cycle attractor. In simulation performed here, we gain information that a system with large number agents based on action on input K equals to two, will reach equilibrium and stable condition over strategies taken out by its agents faster than higher input, that is K equals to three. Equilibrium reached in longer interval, yet it is stable over strategies carried out by agents.

Keywords: evolutionary game theory; N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma; cooperation; social stability; Random Boolean Network; Transition Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-evo and nep-mic
Date: 2004-05-04
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14
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