Negociación Nash Gradual con Agenda Endógena: Un Modelo Trayectoria-Dependiente

Julian Arévalo

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: This article proposes a methodology to attack the problem of considering the bargaining agenda as an endogenous phenomenon to the problem of gradual bargaining recognizing such problems as path-dependent processes. Main results of short, medium and long term in the bargaining are presented, as well as a possible application of the model.

Keywords: bargaining games; path-dependent processes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07-08
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30. Comments are received.
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0407001

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