Riesgo Moral y Contratos: Cierta Evidencia Experimental

Julian Arévalo and Jair Ojeda ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper shows one type of asymetric information problems, their theorethical implications, the design of contracts that mitigate them, as well as some experimental evidence. Furthermore, by extrapolating the results, the paper tries to illustrate certain macroeconomic implications obtained under a controlled environment.

Keywords: Moral Hazard; Contracts; Experimental Economics; Assymetric Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 C90 D89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2004-07-08, Revised 2004-07-18
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20

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http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0407/0407002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Riesgo moral y contratos: cierta evidencia experimental (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0407002

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