Transfer Rate Rules and Core Selections in NTU Games

Vincent Iehlé ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: Different kinds of asymmetries between players can occur in core allocations, in that case the stability of the concept is questioned. One remedy consists in selecting robust core allocations. We review, in this note, results that all select core allocations in NTU games with different concepts of robustness. Within a unified approach, we deduce the existence of allocations in: the partnered core, the social stable core, the core intersected with average prekernel, the weak inner core. We use a recent contribution of Bonnisseau and Iehlé (2003) that states the existence of core allocations with a transfer rate rule equilibrium under a dependent balancedness assumption. It shall turn out to be manipulable tools for selecting the core.

Keywords: Cooperative games; dependent balancedness; core selections in NTU games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-11-02
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 10
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0411/0411001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games (2004)
Journal Article: Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0411001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().