The Israel-Palestine Question – A Case for Application of Neutrosophic Game Theory

Sukanto Bhattacharya, Florentin Smarandache and Mohammad Khoshnevisan
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Sukanto Bhattacharya: School of Accounting - Economics & Finance, Deakin University, Australia
Florentin Smarandache: Department of Mathematics & Statistics, The University of New Mexico, U.S.A.
Mohammad Khoshnevisan: School of Accounting & Finance, Griffith University, Australia

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Abstract: In our present paper, we have explored the possibilities and developed arguments for an application of principles of neutrosophic game theory as a generalization of the fuzzy game theory model to a better understanding of the Israel-Palestine problem in terms of the goals and governing strategies of either side. We build on an earlier attempted justification of a game theoretic explanation of this problem by Yakir Plessner (2001) and go on to argue in favour of a neutrosophic adaptation of the standard 2x2 zero-sum game theoretic model in order to identify an optimal outcome

Keywords: Israel-Palestine conflict; Oslo Agreement; fuzzy games; neutrosophic semantic space (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-11-17
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 10. The paper is in the form of a short research note that posits and applies a neutrosophic game theory paradigm as an extension to the dynamic fuzzy game; in the specific context of the Israel-Palestine problem.

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0411007

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