Environmental management: analytical approximate solutions to the problem of detecting optimal random audit schemes

Paola Ferretti ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: In the contest of environmental management, the problem of minimizing the expected cost due to random checking processes and a possible failure is here addressed. Non-homogeneous Poisson checking processes with continuous non-decreasing intensity are considered, leading to the explicit detection of the sub-optimal solution for exponential or uniform failure density functions. The dynamic of the optimal solution is then analized using the phase-diagram tool.

Keywords: Environmental management; audit scheme; random inspections; non-homogeneous Poisson checking process; optimal control; exponential failure density function; uniform failure density function. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-env
Date: 2004-11-29
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 13
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0411010

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