Disclosure to an Audience with Limited Attention

David Hirshleifer, Sonya Seongyeon Lim () and Siew Hong Teoh

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: In our model, informed players decide whether or not to disclose, and observers allocate attention among disclosed signals, and toward reasoning through the implications of a failure to disclose. In equilibrium disclosure is incomplete, and observers are unrealistically optimistic. Nevertheless, regulation requiring greater disclosure can reduce observers' belief accuracies and welfare. A stronger tendency to neglect disclosed signals increases disclosure, whereas a stronger tendency to neglect failures to disclose reduces disclosure. Observer beliefs are influenced by the salience of disclosed signals, and disclosure in one arena can crowd out disclosure in other fundamentally unrelated arenas.

Keywords: Disclosure policy; disclosure regulation; limited attention; behavioral economics; behavioral accounting; behavioral finance; market efficiency; psychology and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M41 D82 G14 G18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc
Date: 2004-12-04
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 49. PDF
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Working Paper: Disclosure to an Audience with Limited Attention (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412002

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