On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games

Guilherme Carmona ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: We consider an asymptotic version of Mas-Colell's theorem on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games. Our result states that, if players' payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all sufficiently large games have an epsilon - pure, epsilon - equilibrium for all epsilon greater than 0. We also show that our result is equivalent to Mas-Colell's existence theorem, implying that it can properly be considered as its asymptotic version.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Asymptotic Results; Pure Strategies; Approximate equilibria; Equicontinuity; Purification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2004-12-21
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 24. none
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games (2004)
Working Paper: On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412008

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