Coalition Strategies and Reduction of GHG Emissions

Vihang Mahendra Patel ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: The Flexible Mechanisms articulated in the Kyoto Protocol provide a robust framework for emission reduction issue in a manner that is not just economically efficient, but is also pro-growth for trade. In the presence of liquid or illiquid markets, to attain higher value from the emission trading, we have shown that coalition strategies provide a pertinent alternative to production optimization measures which may not be feasible at times. The whole game is analyzed taking a resource based view of the strategic factor markets. We have also illustrated the measures needed to provide stability to the coalitions and hence the coalition strategies.

Keywords: coalition; strategy; game theory; emission; environment; resource based view; strategic factor market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-res
Date: 2005-01-19
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 16
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0501/0501002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0501002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().