Supermodular social games

Ludovic Renou

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: A social game is a generalization of a strategic-form game, in which not only the payoff of each player depends upon the strategies chosen by their opponents, but also their set of admissible strategies. Debreu (1952) proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium in social games with continuous strategy spaces. Recently, Polowczuk and Radzik (2004) have proposed a discrete counterpart of Debreu's theorem for two-person social games satisfying some ``convexity properties'. In this note, we define the class of supermodular social games and give an existence theorem for this class of games.

Keywords: Strategic-form games; social games; supermodularity; Nash equilibrium; existence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2005-02-03
Note: Type of Document - pdf
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0502002

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