Cooperative investment games or population games

Yaron Azrieli and Ehud Lehrer ()

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Abstract: The model of a cooperative fuzzy game is interpreted as both a population game and a cooperative investment game. Three types of core- like solutions induced by these interpretations are introduced and investigated. The interpretation of a game as a population game allows us to define sub-games. We show that, unlike the well-known Shapley- Shubik theorem on market games (Shapley-Shubik) there might be a population game such that each of its sub-games has a non-empty core and, nevertheless, it is not a market game. It turns out that, in order to be a market game, a population game needs to be also homogeneous. We also discuss some special classes of population games such as convex games, exact games, homogeneousgames and additive games.

Keywords: investment game; population game; fuzzy game; core-like solution; market game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2005-03-16
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0503007

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