Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity in Majoritarian Bargaining

Maria Montero ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: Inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games. I show that inequity aversion can actually increase the asymmetry of payoff division inside the coalition that forms in majoritarian bargaining games.

Keywords: noncooperative bargaining; majority games; inequity aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-05-20
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 4
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0505007

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