EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Network Effect

Fan-chin Kung ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: Many local public goods are provided by coalitions and some of them have network effects. Namely, people prefer to consume a public good in a coalition with more members. This paper adopts the Drèze and Greenberg (1980) type utility function where players have preferences over goods as well as coalition members. In a game with anonymous and separable network effect, the core is nonempty when coalition feasible sets are monotonic and players' preferences over public goods have connected support. All core allocations consist of connected coalitions and they are Tiebout equilibria as well. We also examine the no-exodus equilibrium for games whose feasible sets are not monotonic.

Keywords: Coalition formation; core; network effect; local public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net, nep-pbe and nep-ure
Date: 2005-06-28
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 17
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/game/papers/0506/0506007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0506007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().

 
Page updated 2017-07-31
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0506007