Market Power Assessment and Mitigation in Hydrothermal Systems
Luiz Barroso () and
Additional contact information
Rafael Kelman: PSR
Mario Pereira: PSR
Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
The objective of this work is to investigate market power issues in bid- based hydrothermal scheduling. Initially, market power is simulated with a single stage Nash-Cournot equilibrium model. Market power assessment for multiple stages is then carried through a stochastic dynamic programming scheme. The decision in each stage and state is the equilibrium of a multi-agent game. Thereafter, mitigation measures, specially bilateral contracts, are investigated. Case studies with data taken from the Brazilian system are presented and discussed.
Keywords: Game theory; Hydroelectric-thermal power generation; Power generation economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 6
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0508009
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().