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On the Shapley value of a minimum cost spanning tree problem

Gustavo Bergantiños and Juan Vidal-Puga

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: We associate an optimistic coalitional game with each minimum cost spanning tree problem. We define the worth of a coalition as the cost of connection assuming that the rest of the agents are already connected. We define a cost sharing rule as the Shapley value of this optimistic game. We prove that this rule coincides with a rule present in the literature under different names. We also introduce a new characterization using a property of equal contributions.

Keywords: minimum; cost; spanning; tree; problems; Shapley; value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2005-09-01
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 17
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