A language for the construction of preferences under uncertainty
Marco LiCalzi ()
Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
This paper studies a target-based procedure to rank lotteries that is normatively and observationally equivalent to the expected utility model. In view of this equivalence, the traditional utility-based language for decision making may be substituted with an alternative target-based language. Switching language may have significant modelling consequences. To exemplify, we contrast the utility-based viewpoint of prospect theory against the target-based viewpoint and provide an explanation of Allais’ paradox based on context dependence instead of distorted probabilities.
Keywords: expected utility; prospect theory; target-based decisions; choice anomalies; benchmarking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 21. 25 pages, pdf
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0509002
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().