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A Note on Common Prior

Miklós Pintér
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Miklós Pintér: Corvinus University of Budapest

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: Harsányi introduced the concept of type space in an intuitive way. Later Heifetz and Samet formalized it. Harsányi used conditional probabilities to model the beliefs of the players, Heifetz and Samet avoided using conditional probabilities formally. We show that in both cases the concept of transition probability can reproduce the models, moreover, the transition probability approach fits to both Harsányi's intuition and the formalization of Heifetz and Samet. As a consequence, our results suggest that the concept of common prior is not appropriate to determine the players' beliefs. Two examples are also given.

Keywords: Beliefs; Conditional probability; Common Prior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2005-10-20
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 10
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