A Focal-Point Solution for Bargaining Problems with Coalition Structure

Gustavo Bergantiños, Balbina Casas- Méndez, Gloria Fiestras- Janeiro and Juan Vidal-Puga
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Balbina Casas- Méndez: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
Gloria Fiestras- Janeiro: Universidade de Vigo

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Abstract: In this paper we study the restriction, to the class of bargaining problems with coalition structure, of several values which have been proposed on the class of non-transferable utility games with coalition structure. We prove that all of them coincide with the solution independently studied in Chae and Heidhues (2004) and Vidal-Puga (2005a). Several axiomatic characterizations and two noncooperative mechanisms are proposed.

Keywords: coalition; structure; bargaining; values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: Written
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0511006

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