Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games
Maria Montero ()
Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
This paper shows that altruism may be beneficial in bargaining when there is competition for bargaining partners. In a game with random proposers, the most altruistic player has the highest material payoff if players are sufficiently patient. However, this advantage is eroded as the discount factor increases, and if players are perfectly patient altruism and spite become irrelevant for material payoffs.
Keywords: altruism; spite; bargaining; competition; coalition formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 21
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Journal Article: Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0512004
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