Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets

Robert M. Anderson, Walter Tockel and Lin Zhou
Additional contact information
Robert M. Anderson: University of California at Berkeley, anderson@econ.berkeley.edu
Walter Tockel: University of Bielefeld

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Abstract: In a nontransferable utility exchange economy with a continuum of agents, the Mas-Collel bargaining set coincides with the set of Walrasian equilibria. In this paper, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set, as well as a smaller bargaining set due to Zhou, may fail to converge to competitive outcomes in large finite NTU exchange economies.

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-03-02
Note: 18 pages, postscript file, compressed
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Related works:
Working Paper: Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets (1994)
Journal Article: Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets (1997)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9403001

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