Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoners' Dilemma

Oliver Kirchkamp ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: The paper applies the idea of evolution to a spatial model. We assume that the prisoners' dilemma is played only within a neighborhood and that evolutionary pressure works also only on a local level. Discriminatory behavior of players is introduced representing strategies as small automata, identical for a player but possibly in different states against different neighbors. Extensive simulations show that success among surviving strategies may differ and that in contrast to undiscriminative behavior cooperation persists even in a stochastic environment. Keywords: Evolutionary Game Theory, Networks, Prisoners' Dilemma, Overlapping Generations. JEL-Code: C63, C73, D62, D83, R12, R13.

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-03-09, Revised 1995-10-31
Note: 37 pages, postscript, also available as http://witch.econ3.uni-bonn.de/~oliver/spatEvol.shtml. Hardcopy requests to kirchkamp@witch.econ3.uni-bonn.de
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Related works:
Working Paper: Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoners' Dilemma (1995)
Journal Article: Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners' dilemma (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9403003

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