An Evolutionary Approach to Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments

Asst. Prof. Yong-Gwan Kim
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Asst. Prof. Yong-Gwan Kim: Economics

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper provides an evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination games with auction. A set- valued solution concept is defined for a finite population model under the best response evolutionary dynamics and applied to their games. It is shown that our solution concept captures the role of auction as a tacit communication device and predicts the equilibria chosen by players in the real experiments. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C72, C92.

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-03-28
Note: Zipped using PKZIP v2.04, encoded using UUENCODE v5.15. Zipped file includes 1 file -- Vhbb7 (body in WP5.1, 29 pages)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9403006

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