Analyzing Social Network Structures in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal

Mark D. Smucker, E. Ann Stanley and Dan Ashlock
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Mark D. Smucker: Univ. of Wisc.-Madison, Dept. of Computer Sciences
E. Ann Stanley: Iowa State Univ., Dept. of Mathematics
Dan Ashlock: Iowa State Univ., Dept. of Mathematics

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal (IPD/CR) is an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with evolution that allows players to choose and to refuse their game partners. From individual behaviors, behavioral population structures emerge. In this report, we examine one particular IPD/CR environment and document the social network methods used to identify population behaviors found within this complex adaptive system. In contrast to the standard homogeneous population of nice cooperators, we have also found metastable populations of mixed strategies within this environment. In particular, the social networks of interesting populations and their evolution are examined.

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-01-17
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9501001

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