Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies

Vijay Krishna and Robert W. Rosenthal

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Abstract: Motivated by recent auctions of licenses for the radio frequency spec trum, we consider situations where multiple objects are auctioned simultaneousl y by means of a second-price, sealed-bid auction. For some buyers, called globa l bidders, the value of multiple objects exceeds the sum of the objects' values separately. Others, called local bidders, are interested in only one object. I n a simple independent private values setting, we (a) characterize an equilibri um that is symmetric among the global bidders; (b) show that the addition of bi dders often leads to less aggressive bidding; and (c) compare the revenues obta ined from the simultaneous auction to those from its sequential counterpart.

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-03-13
Note: 32 pages, Figures are not included and may be obtained by FAX by send ing an e-mail message to either author.
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Related works:
Working Paper: Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies (1995)
Working Paper: Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies (1995)
Journal Article: Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies (1996)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9503004

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