Communication, Computability and Common Interest Games

Luca Anderlini

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper provides a theory of equilibrium selection for one-shot two- player finite-action strategic-form common interest games. A single round of costless unlimited pre-play communication is allowed. Players are restricted to use strategies which are computable in the sense of Church's thesis. The equilibrium notion used involves perturbations which are themselves computable. The only equilibrium payoff vector which survives these strategic restrictions and the computable perturbations is the unique Pareto-efficient one.

Keywords: Common Interest Games; Computability; Pre-play Communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-10-19
Note: Type of Document - LaTex; prepared on EmTex - PC; to print on PostScript 600DPI; pages: 39; figures: included
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Related works:
Working Paper: COMMUNICATION, COMPUTABILITY AND COMMON INTEREST GAMES (1990)
Journal Article: Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9510003

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