The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis

Jean-Pierre Benoit and Vijay Krishna
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Jean-Pierre Benoit: NYU
Vijay Krishna: Penn State

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: We present a synthesis of various folk theorems for repeated games.

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-01-17
Note: 33 pages, LaTeX file created using Scientific Workplace 2.01
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