On the Relation Between Perfect Equilibria in Extensive Form Games and Proper Equilibria in Normal Form Games

John Hillas
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John Hillas: SUNY at Stony Brook

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper examines the question of the extent to which it is true that any equilibrium that is quasi-perfect in any extensive form game having a given normal form is necessarily proper. If one fixes not only the equilibrium in question but also a a sequence of completely mixed strategies converging to that equilibrium then indeed the notions are equivalent. However the stronger result is not true. An example of a normal form game is given in which there is an equilibrium that is quasi-perfect in any extensive form game having a given normal form but not proper.

Keywords: perfect equilibrium; quasi-perfect equilibrium; proper equilibrium; strategicý equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
Note: Type of Document - AMSLaTeX2e; prepared on IBM PC - emTeX; to print on PostScript; pages: 1 + 9 ; figures: included
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9605002

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