Choosing Among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games

Eric Rasmusen ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: Randolph Sloof has written a comment on the lobbying-as-signalling model in Rasmusen (1993) in which he points out an equilibrium I missed and criticizes my emphasis on a particular separating equilibrium. In this response, I discuss how to interpret multiple equilibria in games and how to interpret mixed strategy equilibria in which two types of player with identical incentives must pick different mixing probabilities.

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-07-24
Note: Can be found in ps via my website,
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