A Learning Approach to Auctions

Shlomit Hon-Snir, Dov Monderer and Aner Sela
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Shlomit Hon-Snir: The Technion
Dov Monderer: The Technion
Aner Sela: Bonn University

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Abstract: We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known.

Keywords: Auctions; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D83 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
Note: Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on Unix; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 28
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