The Absent-minded Centipede (revision)

Uwe Dulleck () and Jörg Oechssler

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: In this note we apply the notion of absent-mindedness (see Piccione and Rubinstein, 1994), which is a form of imperfect recall, to Rosenthal's (1981) centipede game. We show that for standard versions of the centipede game a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which play is continued almost to the end if one player is known to be absent-minded. In fact, it is sufficient that one player is known to be absent-minded with sufficiently high probability.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-10-08, Revised 1996-10-11
Note: 8 pages, this revision actually contains Figure 1.
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9610005

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