Fair bargains: distributive justice and Nash Bargaining Theory

Marco Mariotii
Additional contact information
Marco Mariotii: University of Manchester

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: The Suppes-Sen dominance relation is a weak and widely accepted criterion of distributive justice. We propose its application to Nash bargaining theory. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is characterised by replacing the contriversial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom with an axiom embodying the Suppes-Sen Principle. More precisely, the Suppes-Sen relation is shown to be equivalent to the (relation implied by the) NBS in the presence of Scale Covariance. The characterisation is far more robust than the standard one with respect to variations in the domain of bargaining problems. It is shown that a subset of Nash's axioms imply the Suppes-Sen relation.

Keywords: Suppes-Sen; NBS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-11-26, Revised 1996-12-06
Note: Type of Document - word; prepared on pc; to print on PostScript; pages: 27; figures: included
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9611/9611003.html (text/html)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9611/9611003.ps.gz (application/postscript)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9611/9611003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9611003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().