Education and Job Market Signalling: A Comment

Massimo Giannini
Additional contact information
Massimo Giannini: University of Rome Tor Vergata

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: In this paper the Signalling approach to the explanation of wage differentials is analyzed both under a microeconomic and a macroeconomic viewpoint. Departuring from the classical Spence's model, the introduction of inequalities in accessing to education leads to redistributive effects among workers and firms. Moreover the existence of factors related both to local and to parental externalities greately reduce the informative power of education about individual ability.

Keywords: Signalling; Earnings; distribution; Entropy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 D82 J31 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-04-17
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP Laser; pages: 23; figures: included
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9704/9704002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9704002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().