Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information

Oscar Volij
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Oscar Volij: Brown University

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core is introduced, that requires credibility from the improvements.

Keywords: Asymmetric Information; Core; Common Knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 1997-11-22
Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on PC-TEX; pages: 17
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9711001

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