A new weight scheme for the Shapley value

Guillaume Haeringer ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: It is well known since Owen (Management Science, 1968) that the weights in the weighted Shapley value cannot be interpreted as a measure of power (i.e. of the ability to bargain) of the players. This paper proposes a new weight scheme for the Shapley value. Weights in this framework have to be interpreted as a measure of bargaining power. Two different axiomatic characterization of this new value are proposed: one including the weights in the axioms and one without.

Keywords: Shapley value; weights; monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 1998-07-15
Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript - A4; pages: 11 . 11 pages, postscript, prepared from dvips
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Related works:
Working Paper: A New Weight Scheme for the Shapley Value (1999)
Journal Article: A new weight scheme for the Shapley value (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9807001

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