A Tragedy Of The Clubs: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions

Paola Manzini () and Marco Mariotti

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: We study how social norms and individual rationality in the process of coalition formation sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the `tragedy of the clubs'. We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division, and show that, contrary to common wisdom, the tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.

Keywords: Clubs; Coalition Formation; Multiperson Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-pub
Date: 1998-08-07
Note: Type of Document - .pdf and .ps versions available; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 38 ; figures: included

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Related works:
Journal Article: A "Tragedy of the Clubs": Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9808001

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