A Note on Varying Mutation Rates in 2 x 2 Coordination Games

Alexander F. Tieman and Harold Houba ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: The model of 2 x 2 coordination games in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993) is extended to allow for a mutation rate that is stochastic over time. The expected time the system spends in the risk dominated equilibrium is systematically underestimated by the standard model in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993) when the latter model's (fixed) mutation rate is equal to the expected mutation rate. A small population result corrects a minor omission in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993).

Keywords: varying mutation rate; risk dominance; coordination games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 1998-09-14
Note: Type of Document - TeX (Scientific Workplace 2.5); prepared on COMPAQ PC; to print on HP Laserjet IV; pages: 14 ; figures: included
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9809/9809002.ps.gz (application/postscript)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9809/9809002.pdf (application/pdf)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9809/9809002.dvi.gz (application/x-dvi)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on Varying Mutation Rates in 2 x 2 Coordination Games (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9809002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().