Joint Outside Options

Paola Manzini () and Marco Mariotti

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: Several contractual situations are such that the parties may `step out' of negotiations and take up outside opportunities only if there is mutual consent to do so. Examples include some forms of employer- employee negotiations, divorce procedures and arbitration. To analyse such cases we develop the general concept of a `joint outside option' and study its effect in the standard bargaining game. Examples from the economics of divorce and theory of the firm are considered in some depth.

Keywords: Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 1999-01-21
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on PC-TEX; to print on HP;
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9901/9901001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Joint Outside Options (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9901001

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