Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games

Hans Haller and Roger Lagunoff ()
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Hans Haller: Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University

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Abstract: This paper examines Markov Perfect equilibria of general, finite state stochastic games. Our main result is that the number of such equilibria is finite for a set of stochastic game payoffs with full Lebesgue measure. We further discuss extensions to lower dimensional stochastic games like the alternating move game.

Keywords: stochastic games; Markov Perfect equilibria; genericity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 1999-01-27, Revised 1999-06-03
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat pdf file; prepared on IBM PC - PC- TEX; to print on Acrobat PDF Writer; pages: 25 ; figures: included.
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9901/9901003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9901003

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