The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis

Jean-Pierre Benoit and Vijay Krishna
Additional contact information
Jean-Pierre Benoit: New York University
Vijay Krishna: Penn State University

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: We present a synthesis of the various folk theorems for repeated games using a model that accommodates both finitely and infinitely repeated games with discounting. We derive a central result for this model and show that the various folk theorems follow as a consequence. Our result encompasses theorems involving epsilon equilibria and incomplete information.

Keywords: Folk Theorems; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 1999-02-03
Note: Type of Document - LaTex; prepared on IBM PC/Scientific Workplace 3.0 ; to print on HP 4; pages: 36; figures: none. December 1998 version
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9902/9902001.tex (application/x-tex)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9902/9902001.ps.gz (application/postscript)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9902/9902001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9902001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().